-
1 experimental philosophy
Дипломатический термин: эмпиризмУниверсальный англо-русский словарь > experimental philosophy
-
2 experimental philosophy
Англо-русский дипломатический словарь > experimental philosophy
-
3 experimental philosophy
English-russian dctionary of diplomacy > experimental philosophy
-
4 experimental
-
5 experimental
/eks,peri'mentl/ * tính từ - dựa trên thí nghiệm - để thí nghiệm - thực nghiệm =experimental philosophy+ triết học thực nghiệm -
6 Grove, Sir William Robert
SUBJECT AREA: Electricity[br]b. 11 July 1811 Swansea, Walesd. 1 August 1896 London, England[br]Welsh chemist and physicist, inventor of the Grove electrochemical primary cell.[br]After education at Brasenose College, Oxford, Grove was called to the Bar in 1835. Instead of immediately practising, he became involved in electrical research, devising in 1839 the cell that bears his name. He became Professor of Experimental Philosophy at the London Institution from 1840 to 1845; it was during this period that he built up his high reputation among physicists. In 1846 he published On the Correlation of Physical Forces, which was based on a course of his lectures. He returned to the practice of law, becoming a judge in 1871, but retained his interest in scientific research during his sixteen-year occupancy of the Bench. He served as a member of the Council of the Royal Society in 1846 and 1847 and played a leading part in its reform. Contributing to the science of electrochemistry, he invented the Grove cell, which together with its modification by Bunsen became an important source of electrical energy during the middle of the nineteenth century, before mechanically driven generators became available. The Grove cell had a platinum electrode immersed in strong nitric acid, separated by a porous diaphragm from a zinc electrode in weak sulphuric acid. The hydrogen formed at the platinum electrode was immediately oxidized by the acid, turning it into water. This avoided the polarization which occurred in the early copper-zinc cells. It was a very powerful primary cell with a high voltage and a low internal resistance, but it produced objectionable fumes. Grove also invented his "gas battery", the earliest fuel cell, in which a current resulted from the chemical energy released from combining oxygen and hydrogen. This was developed by Rawcliffe and others, and found applications as a power source in manned spacecraft.[br]Principal Honours and DistinctionsKnighted 1872. FRS 1840. Fellow of the Chemistry Society 1841. Royal Society Royal Medal 1847.Bibliography1846, On the Correlation of Physical Forces, London; 1874, 6th edn, with reprints of many of Grove's papers (his only book, an early view on the conservation of energy).1839, "On a small voltaic battery of great energy", Philosophical Magazine 15:287–93 (his account of his cell).Further ReadingObituary, 1896, Electrician 37:483–4.K.R.Webb, 1961, "Sir William Robert Grove (1811–1896) and the origin of the fuel cell", Journal of the Royal Institute of Chemistry 85: 291–3 (for the present-day significance of Grove's experiments).C.C.Gillispie (ed.), 1972, Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Vol. V, New York, pp. 559–61.GWBiographical history of technology > Grove, Sir William Robert
-
7 Wheatstone, Sir Charles
SUBJECT AREA: Telecommunications[br]b. 1802 near Gloucester, Englandd. 19 October 1875 Paris, France[br]English physicist, pioneer of electric telegraphy.[br]Wheatstone's family moved to London when he was 4 years old. He was educated at various schools in London and excelled in physics and mathematics. He qualified for a French prize but forfeited it because he was too shy to recite a speech in French at the prize-giving.An uncle, also called Charles Wheatstone, has a musical instrument manufacturing business where young Charles went to work. He was fascinated by the science of music, but did not enjoy business life. After the uncle's death, Charles and his brother William took over the business. Charles developed and patented the concertina, which the firm assembled from parts made by "outworkers". He devoted much of his time to studying the physics of sound and mechanism of sound transmission through solids. He sent speech and music over considerable distances through solid rods and stretched wires, and envisaged communication at a distance. He concluded, however, that electrical methods were more promising.In 1834 Wheatstone was appointed Professor of Experimental Philosophy—a part-time posi-tion—in the new King's College, London, which gave him some research facilities. He conducted experiments with a telegraph system using several miles of wire in the college corridors. Jointly with William Fothergill Cooke, in 1837 he obtained the first patent for a practical electric telegraph, and much of the remainder of his life was devoted to its improvement. In 1843 he gave a paper to the Royal Society surveying the state of electrical measurements and drew attention to a bridge circuit known ever since as the "Wheatstone bridge", although he clearly attributed it to S.H.Christie. Wheatstone devised the "ABC" telegraph, for use on private lines by anyone who could read, and a high-speed automatic telegraph which was adopted by the Post Office and used for many years. He also worked on the French and Belgian telegraph systems; he died when taken ill on a business visit to Paris.[br]Further ReadingB.Bowers, 1975, Sir Charles Wheatstone FRS, London: HMSO.BBBiographical history of technology > Wheatstone, Sir Charles
-
8 Wren, Sir Christopher
SUBJECT AREA: Architecture and building[br]b. 20 October 1632 East Knoyle, Wiltshire, Englandd. 25 February 1723 London, England[br]English architect whose background in scientific research and achievement enhanced his handling of many near-intractable architectural problems.[br]Born into a High Church and Royalist family, the young Wren early showed outstanding intellectual ability and at Oxford in 1654 was described as "that miracle of a youth". Educated at Westminster School, he went up to Oxford, where he graduated at the age of 19 and obtained his master's degree two years later. From this time onwards his interests were in science, primarily astronomy but also physics, engineering and meteorology. While still at college he developed theories about and experimentally solved some fifty varied problems. At the age of 25 Wren was appointed to the Chair of Astronomy at Gresham College in London, but he soon returned to Oxford as Savilian Professor of Astronomy there. At the same time he became one of the founder members of the Society of Experimental Philosophy at Oxford, which was awarded its Royal Charter soon after the Restoration of 1660; Wren, together with such men as Isaac Newton, Robert Hooke, John Evelyn and Robert Boyle, then found himself a member of the Royal Society.Wren's architectural career began with the classical chapel that he built, at the request of his uncle, the Bishop of Ely, for Pembroke College, Cambridge (1663). From this time onwards, until he died at the age of 91, he was fully occupied with a wide and taxing variety of architectural problems which he faced in the execution of all the great building schemes of the day. His scientific background and inventive mind stood him in good stead in solving such difficulties with an often unusual approach and concept. Nowhere was this more apparent than in his rebuilding of fifty-one churches in the City of London after the Great Fire, in the construction of the new St Paul's Cathedral and in the grand layout of the Royal Hospital at Greenwich.The first instance of Wren's approach to constructional problems was in his building of the Sheldonian Theatre in Oxford (1664–9). He based his design upon that of the Roman Theatre of Marcellus (13–11 BC), which he had studied from drawings in Serlio's book of architecture. Wren's reputation as an architect was greatly enhanced by his solution to the roofing problem here. The original theatre in Rome, like all Roman-theatres, was a circular building open to the sky; this would be unsuitable in the climate of Oxford and Wren wished to cover the English counterpart without using supporting columns, which would have obscured the view of the stage. He solved this difficulty mathematically, with the aid of his colleague Dr Wallis, the Professor of Geometry, by means of a timber-trussed roof supporting a painted ceiling which represented the open sky.The City of London's churches were rebuilt over a period of nearly fifty years; the first to be completed and reopened was St Mary-at-Hill in 1676, and the last St Michael Cornhill in 1722, when Wren was 89. They had to be rebuilt upon the original medieval sites and they illustrate, perhaps more clearly than any other examples of Wren's work, the fertility of his imagination and his ability to solve the most intractable problems of site, limitation of space and variation in style and material. None of the churches is like any other. Of the varied sites, few are level or possess right-angled corners or parallel sides of equal length, and nearly all were hedged in by other, often larger, buildings. Nowhere is his versatility and inventiveness shown more clearly than in his designs for the steeples. There was no English precedent for a classical steeple, though he did draw upon the Dutch examples of the 1630s, because the London examples had been medieval, therefore Roman Catholic and Gothic, churches. Many of Wren's steeples are, therefore, Gothic steeples in classical dress, but many were of the greatest originality and delicate beauty: for example, St Mary-le-Bow in Cheapside; the "wedding cake" St Bride in Fleet Street; and the temple diminuendo concept of Christ Church in Newgate Street.In St Paul's Cathedral Wren showed his ingenuity in adapting the incongruous Royal Warrant Design of 1675. Among his gradual and successful amendments were the intriguing upper lighting of his two-storey choir and the supporting of the lantern by a brick cone inserted between the inner and outer dome shells. The layout of the Royal Hospital at Greenwich illustrates Wren's qualities as an overall large-scale planner and designer. His terms of reference insisted upon the incorporation of the earlier existing Queen's House, erected by Inigo Jones, and of John Webb's King Charles II block. The Queen's House, in particular, created a difficult problem as its smaller size rendered it out of scale with the newer structures. Wren's solution was to make it the focal centre of a great vista between the main flanking larger buildings; this was a masterstroke.[br]Principal Honours and DistinctionsKnighted 1673. President, Royal Society 1681–3. Member of Parliament 1685–7 and 1701–2. Surveyor, Greenwich Hospital 1696. Surveyor, Westminster Abbey 1699.Surveyor-General 1669–1712.Further ReadingR.Dutton, 1951, The Age of Wren, Batsford.M.Briggs, 1953, Wren the Incomparable, Allen \& Unwin. M.Whinney, 1971, Wren, Thames \& Hudson.K.Downes, 1971, Christopher Wren, Allen Lane.G.Beard, 1982, The Work of Sir Christopher Wren, Bartholomew.DY -
9 Bibliography
■ Aitchison, J. (1987). Noam Chomsky: Consensus and controversy. New York: Falmer Press.■ Anderson, J. R. (1980). Cognitive psychology and its implications. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Anderson, J. R. (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Anderson, J. R. (1995). Cognitive psychology and its implications (4th ed.). New York: W. H. Freeman.■ Archilochus (1971). In M. L. West (Ed.), Iambi et elegi graeci (Vol. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press.■ Armstrong, D. M. (1990). The causal theory of the mind. In W. G. Lycan (Ed.), Mind and cognition: A reader (pp. 37-47). Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. (Originally published in 1981 in The nature of mind and other essays, Ithaca, NY: University Press).■ Atkins, P. W. (1992). Creation revisited. Oxford: W. H. Freeman & Company.■ Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do things with words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Bacon, F. (1878). Of the proficience and advancement of learning divine and human. In The works of Francis Bacon (Vol. 1). Cambridge, MA: Hurd & Houghton.■ Bacon, R. (1928). Opus majus (Vol. 2). R. B. Burke (Trans.). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.■ Bar-Hillel, Y. (1960). The present status of automatic translation of languages. In F. L. Alt (Ed.), Advances in computers (Vol. 1). New York: Academic Press.■ Barr, A., & E. A. Feigenbaum (Eds.) (1981). The handbook of artificial intelligence (Vol. 1). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.■ Barr, A., & E. A. Feigenbaum (Eds.) (1982). The handbook of artificial intelligence (Vol. 2). Los Altos, CA: William Kaufman.■ Barron, F. X. (1963). The needs for order and for disorder as motives in creative activity. In C. W. Taylor & F. X. Barron (Eds.), Scientific creativity: Its rec ognition and development (pp. 153-160). New York: Wiley.■ Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Bartley, S. H. (1969). Principles of perception. London: Harper & Row.■ Barzun, J. (1959). The house of intellect. New York: Harper & Row.■ Beach, F. A., D. O. Hebb, C. T. Morgan & H. W. Nissen (Eds.) (1960). The neu ropsychology of Lashley. New York: McGraw-Hill.■ Berkeley, G. (1996). Principles of human knowledge: Three Dialogues. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally published in 1710.)■ Berlin, I. (1953). The hedgehog and the fox: An essay on Tolstoy's view of history. NY: Simon & Schuster.■ Bierwisch, J. (1970). Semantics. In J. Lyons (Ed.), New horizons in linguistics. Baltimore: Penguin Books.■ Black, H. C. (1951). Black's law dictionary. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing.■ Bloom, A. (1981). The linguistic shaping of thought: A study in the impact of language on thinking in China and the West. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.■ Bobrow, D. G., & D. A. Norman (1975). Some principles of memory schemata. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representation and understanding: Stud ies in Cognitive Science (pp. 131-149). New York: Academic Press.■ Boden, M. A. (1977). Artificial intelligence and natural man. New York: Basic Books.■ Boden, M. A. (1981). Minds and mechanisms. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.■ Boden, M. A. (1990a). The creative mind: Myths and mechanisms. London: Cardinal.■ Boden, M. A. (1990b). The philosophy of artificial intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.■ Boden, M. A. (1994). Precis of The creative mind: Myths and mechanisms. Behavioral and brain sciences 17, 519-570.■ Boden, M. (1996). Creativity. In M. Boden (Ed.), Artificial Intelligence (2nd ed.). San Diego: Academic Press.■ Bolter, J. D. (1984). Turing's man: Western culture in the computer age. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.■ Bolton, N. (1972). The psychology of thinking. London: Methuen.■ Bourne, L. E. (1973). Some forms of cognition: A critical analysis of several papers. In R. Solso (Ed.), Contemporary issues in cognitive psychology (pp. 313324). Loyola Symposium on Cognitive Psychology (Chicago 1972). Washington, DC: Winston.■ Bransford, J. D., N. S. McCarrell, J. J. Franks & K. E. Nitsch (1977). Toward unexplaining memory. In R. Shaw & J. D. Bransford (Eds.), Perceiving, acting, and knowing (pp. 431-466). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Breger, L. (1981). Freud's unfinished journey. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.■ Brehmer, B. (1986). In one word: Not from experience. In H. R. Arkes & K. Hammond (Eds.), Judgment and decision making: An interdisciplinary reader (pp. 705-719). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Bresnan, J. (1978). A realistic transformational grammar. In M. Halle, J. Bresnan & G. A. Miller (Eds.), Linguistic theory and psychological reality (pp. 1-59). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Brislin, R. W., W. J. Lonner & R. M. Thorndike (Eds.) (1973). Cross- cultural research methods. New York: Wiley.■ Bronowski, J. (1977). A sense of the future: Essays in natural philosophy. P. E. Ariotti with R. Bronowski (Eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Bronowski, J. (1978). The origins of knowledge and imagination. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.■ Brown, R. O. (1973). A first language: The early stages. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Brown, T. (1970). Lectures on the philosophy of the human mind. In R. Brown (Ed.), Between Hume and Mill: An anthology of British philosophy- 1749- 1843 (pp. 330-387). New York: Random House/Modern Library.■ Bruner, J. S., J. Goodnow & G. Austin (1956). A study of thinking. New York: Wiley.■ Calvin, W. H. (1990). The cerebral symphony: Seashore reflections on the structure of consciousness. New York: Bantam.■ Campbell, J. (1982). Grammatical man: Information, entropy, language, and life. New York: Simon & Schuster.■ Campbell, J. (1989). The improbable machine. New York: Simon & Schuster.■ Carlyle, T. (1966). On heroes, hero- worship and the heroic in history. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. (Originally published in 1841.)■ Carnap, R. (1959). The elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis of language [Ueberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache]. In A. J. Ayer (Ed.), Logical positivism (pp. 60-81) A. Pap (Trans). New York: Free Press. (Originally published in 1932.)■ Cassirer, E. (1946). Language and myth. New York: Harper and Brothers. Reprinted. New York: Dover Publications, 1953.■ Cattell, R. B., & H. J. Butcher (1970). Creativity and personality. In P. E. Vernon (Ed.), Creativity. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books.■ Caudill, M., & C. Butler (1990). Naturally intelligent systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Chandrasekaran, B. (1990). What kind of information processing is intelligence? A perspective on AI paradigms and a proposal. In D. Partridge & R. Wilks (Eds.), The foundations of artificial intelligence: A sourcebook (pp. 14-46). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Charniak, E., & McDermott, D. (1985). Introduction to artificial intelligence. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.■ Chase, W. G., & H. A. Simon (1988). The mind's eye in chess. In A. Collins & E. E. Smith (Eds.), Readings in cognitive science: A perspective from psychology and artificial intelligence (pp. 461-493). San Mateo, CA: Kaufmann.■ Cheney, D. L., & R. M. Seyfarth (1990). How monkeys see the world: Inside the mind of another species. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.■ Chi, M.T.H., R. Glaser & E. Rees (1982). Expertise in problem solving. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the psychology of human intelligence (pp. 7-73). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. The Hague: Mouton. Janua Linguarum.■ Chomsky, N. (1964). A transformational approach to syntax. In J. A. Fodor & J. J. Katz (Eds.), The structure of language: Readings in the philosophy of lan guage (pp. 211-245). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.■ Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Chomsky, N. (1972). Language and mind (enlarged ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.■ Chomsky, N. (1979). Language and responsibility. New York: Pantheon.■ Chomsky, N. (1986). Knowledge of language: Its nature, origin and use. New York: Praeger Special Studies.■ Churchland, P. (1979). Scientific realism and the plasticity of mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.■ Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Churchland, P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Clark, A. (1996). Philosophical Foundations. In M. A. Boden (Ed.), Artificial in telligence (2nd ed.). San Diego: Academic Press.■ Clark, H. H., & T. B. Carlson (1981). Context for comprehension. In J. Long & A. Baddeley (Eds.), Attention and performance (Vol. 9, pp. 313-330). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Clarke, A. C. (1984). Profiles of the future: An inquiry into the limits of the possible. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.■ Claxton, G. (1980). Cognitive psychology: A suitable case for what sort of treatment? In G. Claxton (Ed.), Cognitive psychology: New directions (pp. 1-25). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.■ Code, M. (1985). Order and organism. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.■ Collingwood, R. G. (1972). The idea of history. New York: Oxford University Press.■ Coopersmith, S. (1967). The antecedents of self- esteem. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Copland, A. (1952). Music and imagination. London: Oxford University Press.■ Coren, S. (1994). The intelligence of dogs. New York: Bantam Books.■ Cottingham, J. (Ed.) (1996). Western philosophy: An anthology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.■ Cox, C. (1926). The early mental traits of three hundred geniuses. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.■ Craik, K.J.W. (1943). The nature of explanation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Cronbach, L. J. (1990). Essentials of psychological testing (5th ed.). New York: HarperCollins.■ Cronbach, L. J., & R. E. Snow (1977). Aptitudes and instructional methods. New York: Irvington. Paperback edition, 1981.■ Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1993). The evolving self. New York: Harper Perennial.■ Culler, J. (1976). Ferdinand de Saussure. New York: Penguin Books.■ Curtius, E. R. (1973). European literature and the Latin Middle Ages. W. R. Trask (Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.■ D'Alembert, J.L.R. (1963). Preliminary discourse to the encyclopedia of Diderot. R. N. Schwab (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.■ Dampier, W. C. (1966). A history of modern science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Darwin, C. (1911). The life and letters of Charles Darwin (Vol. 1). Francis Darwin (Ed.). New York: Appleton.■ Davidson, D. (1970) Mental events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and theory (pp. 79-101). Amherst: University of Massachussetts Press.■ Davies, P. (1995). About time: Einstein's unfinished revolution. New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone.■ Davis, R., & J. J. King (1977). An overview of production systems. In E. Elcock & D. Michie (Eds.), Machine intelligence 8. Chichester, England: Ellis Horwood.■ Davis, R., & D. B. Lenat (1982). Knowledge- based systems in artificial intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill.■ Dawkins, R. (1982). The extended phenotype: The gene as the unit of selection. Oxford: W. H. Freeman.■ deKleer, J., & J. S. Brown (1983). Assumptions and ambiguities in mechanistic mental models (1983). In D. Gentner & A. L. Stevens (Eds.), Mental modes (pp. 155-190). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Dennett, D. C. (1978a). Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on mind and psychology. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.■ Dennett, D. C. (1978b). Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. In D. C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.■ Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin's dangerous idea: Evolution and the meanings of life. New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone.■ Descartes, R. (1897-1910). Traite de l'homme. In Oeuvres de Descartes (Vol. 11, pp. 119-215). Paris: Charles Adam & Paul Tannery. (Originally published in 1634.)■ Descartes, R. (1950). Discourse on method. L. J. Lafleur (Trans.). New York: Liberal Arts Press. (Originally published in 1637.)■ Descartes, R. (1951). Meditation on first philosophy. L. J. Lafleur (Trans.). New York: Liberal Arts Press. (Originally published in 1641.)■ Descartes, R. (1955). The philosophical works of Descartes. E. S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Trans.). New York: Dover. (Originally published in 1911 by Cambridge University Press.)■ Descartes, R. (1967). Discourse on method (Pt. V). In E. S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 1, pp. 106-118). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1637.)■ Descartes, R. (1970a). Discourse on method. In E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 1, pp. 181-200). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1637.)■ Descartes, R. (1970b). Principles of philosophy. In E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 1, pp. 178-291). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1644.)■ Descartes, R. (1984). Meditations on first philosophy. In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murduch (Trans.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1641.)■ Descartes, R. (1986). Meditations on first philosophy. J. Cottingham (Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1641 as Med itationes de prima philosophia.)■ deWulf, M. (1956). An introduction to scholastic philosophy. Mineola, NY: Dover Books.■ Dixon, N. F. (1981). Preconscious processing. London: Wiley.■ Doyle, A. C. (1986). The Boscombe Valley mystery. In Sherlock Holmes: The com plete novels and stories (Vol. 1). New York: Bantam.■ Dreyfus, H., & S. Dreyfus (1986). Mind over machine. New York: Free Press.■ Dreyfus, H. L. (1972). What computers can't do: The limits of artificial intelligence (revised ed.). New York: Harper & Row.■ Dreyfus, H. L., & S. E. Dreyfus (1986). Mind over machine: The power of human intuition and expertise in the era of the computer. New York: Free Press.■ Edelman, G. M. (1992). Bright air, brilliant fire: On the matter of the mind. New York: Basic Books.■ Ehrenzweig, A. (1967). The hidden order of art. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.■ Einstein, A., & L. Infeld (1938). The evolution of physics. New York: Simon & Schuster.■ Eisenstein, S. (1947). Film sense. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.■ Everdell, W. R. (1997). The first moderns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.■ Eysenck, M. W. (1977). Human memory: Theory, research and individual difference. Oxford: Pergamon.■ Eysenck, M. W. (1982). Attention and arousal: Cognition and performance. Berlin: Springer.■ Eysenck, M. W. (1984). A handbook of cognitive psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Fancher, R. E. (1979). Pioneers of psychology. New York: W. W. Norton.■ Farrell, B. A. (1981). The standing of psychoanalysis. New York: Oxford University Press.■ Feldman, D. H. (1980). Beyond universals in cognitive development. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.■ Fetzer, J. H. (1996). Philosophy and cognitive science (2nd ed.). New York: Paragon House.■ Finke, R. A. (1990). Creative imagery: Discoveries and inventions in visualization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Flanagan, O. (1991). The science of the mind. Cambridge MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Fodor, J. (1983). The modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Frege, G. (1972). Conceptual notation. T. W. Bynum (Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Originally published in 1879.)■ Frege, G. (1979). Logic. In H. Hermes, F. Kambartel & F. Kaulbach (Eds.), Gottlob Frege: Posthumous writings. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Originally published in 1879-1891.)■ Freud, S. (1959). Creative writers and day-dreaming. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 9, pp. 143-153). London: Hogarth Press.■ Freud, S. (1966). Project for a scientific psychology. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The stan dard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 1, pp. 295-398). London: Hogarth Press. (Originally published in 1950 as Aus den AnfaЁngen der Psychoanalyse, in London by Imago Publishing.)■ Freud, S. (1976). Lecture 18-Fixation to traumas-the unconscious. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 16, p. 285). London: Hogarth Press.■ Galileo, G. (1990). Il saggiatore [The assayer]. In S. Drake (Ed.), Discoveries and opinions of Galileo. New York: Anchor Books. (Originally published in 1623.)■ Gassendi, P. (1970). Letter to Descartes. In "Objections and replies." In E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 2, pp. 179-240). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1641.)■ Gazzaniga, M. S. (1988). Mind matters: How mind and brain interact to create our conscious lives. Boston: Houghton Mifflin in association with MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Genesereth, M. R., & N. J. Nilsson (1987). Logical foundations of artificial intelligence. Palo Alto, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.■ Ghiselin, B. (1952). The creative process. New York: Mentor.■ Ghiselin, B. (1985). The creative process. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1952.)■ Gilhooly, K. J. (1996). Thinking: Directed, undirected and creative (3rd ed.). London: Academic Press.■ Glass, A. L., K. J. Holyoak & J. L. Santa (1979). Cognition. Reading, MA: AddisonWesley.■ Goody, J. (1977). The domestication of the savage mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Gruber, H. E. (1980). Darwin on man: A psychological study of scientific creativity (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.■ Gruber, H. E., & S. Davis (1988). Inching our way up Mount Olympus: The evolving systems approach to creative thinking. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity: Contemporary psychological perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Guthrie, E. R. (1972). The psychology of learning. New York: Harper. (Originally published in 1935.)■ Habermas, J. (1972). Knowledge and human interests. Boston: Beacon Press.■ Hadamard, J. (1945). The psychology of invention in the mathematical field. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.■ Hand, D. J. (1985). Artificial intelligence and psychiatry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Harris, M. (1981). The language myth. London: Duckworth.■ Haugeland, J. (Ed.) (1981). Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Haugeland, J. (1981a). The nature and plausibility of cognitivism. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 243-281). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Haugeland, J. (1981b). Semantic engines: An introduction to mind design. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 1-34). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial intelligence: The very idea. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Hawkes, T. (1977). Structuralism and semiotics. Berkeley: University of California Press.■ Hebb, D. O. (1949). The organisation of behaviour. New York: Wiley.■ Hebb, D. O. (1958). A textbook of psychology. Philadelphia: Saunders.■ Hegel, G.W.F. (1910). The phenomenology of mind. J. B. Baille (Trans.). London: Sonnenschein. (Originally published as Phaenomenologie des Geistes, 1807.)■ Heisenberg, W. (1958). Physics and philosophy. New York: Harper & Row.■ Hempel, C. G. (1966). Philosophy of natural science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall.■ Herman, A. (1997). The idea of decline in Western history. New York: Free Press.■ Herrnstein, R. J., & E. G. Boring (Eds.) (1965). A source book in the history of psy chology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Herzmann, E. (1964). Mozart's creative process. In P. H. Lang (Ed.), The creative world of Mozart (pp. 17-30). London: Oldbourne Press.■ Hilgard, E. R. (1957). Introduction to psychology. London: Methuen.■ Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan. London: Crooke.■ Holliday, S. G., & M. J. Chandler (1986). Wisdom: Explorations in adult competence. Basel, Switzerland: Karger.■ Horn, J. L. (1986). In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the psychology of human intelligence (Vol. 3). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.■ Hull, C. (1943). Principles of behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.■ Hume, D. (1955). An inquiry concerning human understanding. New York: Liberal Arts Press. (Originally published in 1748.)■ Hume, D. (1975). An enquiry concerning human understanding. In L. A. SelbyBigge (Ed.), Hume's enquiries (3rd. ed., revised P. H. Nidditch). Oxford: Clarendon. (Spelling and punctuation revised.) (Originally published in 1748.)■ Hume, D. (1978). A treatise of human nature. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.), Hume's enquiries (3rd. ed., revised P. H. Nidditch). Oxford: Clarendon. (With some modifications of spelling and punctuation.) (Originally published in 1690.)■ Hunt, E. (1973). The memory we must have. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language. (pp. 343-371) San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Husserl, E. (1960). Cartesian meditations. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.■ Inhelder, B., & J. Piaget (1958). The growth of logical thinking from childhood to adolescence. New York: Basic Books. (Originally published in 1955 as De la logique de l'enfant a` la logique de l'adolescent. [Paris: Presses Universitaire de France])■ James, W. (1890a). The principles of psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Dover Books.■ James, W. (1890b). The principles of psychology. New York: Henry Holt.■ Jevons, W. S. (1900). The principles of science (2nd ed.). London: Macmillan.■ Johnson, G. (1986). Machinery of the mind: Inside the new science of artificial intelli gence. New York: Random House.■ Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models: Toward a cognitive science of language, inference, and consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1988). The computer and the mind: An introduction to cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Jones, E. (1961). The life and work of Sigmund Freud. L. Trilling & S. Marcus (Eds.). London: Hogarth.■ Jones, R. V. (1985). Complementarity as a way of life. In A. P. French & P. J. Kennedy (Eds.), Niels Bohr: A centenary volume. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Kant, I. (1933). Critique of Pure Reason (2nd ed.). N. K. Smith (Trans.). London: Macmillan. (Originally published in 1781 as Kritik der reinen Vernunft.)■ Kant, I. (1891). Solution of the general problems of the Prolegomena. In E. Belfort (Trans.), Kant's Prolegomena. London: Bell. (With minor modifications.) (Originally published in 1783.)■ Katona, G. (1940). Organizing and memorizing: Studies in the psychology of learning and teaching. New York: Columbia University Press.■ Kaufman, A. S. (1979). Intelligent testing with the WISC-R. New York: Wiley.■ Koestler, A. (1964). The act of creation. New York: Arkana (Penguin).■ Kohlberg, L. (1971). From is to ought. In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology. (pp. 151-235) New York: Academic Press.■ KoЁhler, W. (1925). The mentality of apes. New York: Liveright.■ KoЁhler, W. (1927). The mentality of apes (2nd ed.). Ella Winter (Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.■ KoЁhler, W. (1930). Gestalt psychology. London: G. Bell.■ KoЁhler, W. (1947). Gestalt psychology. New York: Liveright.■ KoЁhler, W. (1969). The task of Gestalt psychology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.■ Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.■ Langer, E. J. (1989). Mindfulness. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.■ Langer, S. (1962). Philosophical sketches. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.■ Langley, P., H. A. Simon, G. L. Bradshaw & J. M. Zytkow (1987). Scientific dis covery: Computational explorations of the creative process. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Lashley, K. S. (1951). The problem of serial order in behavior. In L. A. Jeffress (Ed.), Cerebral mechanisms in behavior, the Hixon Symposium (pp. 112-146) New York: Wiley.■ LeDoux, J. E., & W. Hirst (1986). Mind and brain: Dialogues in cognitive neuroscience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Lehnert, W. (1978). The process of question answering. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Leiber, J. (1991). Invitation to cognitive science. Oxford: Blackwell.■ Lenat, D. B., & G. Harris (1978). Designing a rule system that searches for scientific discoveries. In D. A. Waterman & F. Hayes-Roth (Eds.), Pattern directed inference systems (pp. 25-52) New York: Academic Press.■ Levenson, T. (1995). Measure for measure: A musical history of science. New York: Touchstone. (Originally published in 1994.)■ Leґvi-Strauss, C. (1963). Structural anthropology. C. Jacobson & B. Grundfest Schoepf (Trans.). New York: Basic Books. (Originally published in 1958.)■ Levine, M. W., & J. M. Schefner (1981). Fundamentals of sensation and perception. London: Addison-Wesley.■ Lewis, C. I. (1946). An analysis of knowledge and valuation. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.■ Lighthill, J. (1972). A report on artificial intelligence. Unpublished manuscript, Science Research Council.■ Lipman, M., A. M. Sharp & F. S. Oscanyan (1980). Philosophy in the classroom. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.■ Lippmann, W. (1965). Public opinion. New York: Free Press. (Originally published in 1922.)■ Locke, J. (1956). An essay concerning human understanding. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. (Originally published in 1690.)■ Locke, J. (1975). An essay concerning human understanding. P. H. Nidditch (Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon. (Originally published in 1690.) (With spelling and punctuation modernized and some minor modifications of phrasing.)■ Lopate, P. (1994). The art of the personal essay. New York: Doubleday/Anchor Books.■ Lorimer, F. (1929). The growth of reason. London: Kegan Paul. Machlup, F., & U. Mansfield (Eds.) (1983). The study of information. New York: Wiley.■ Manguel, A. (1996). A history of reading. New York: Viking.■ Markey, J. F. (1928). The symbolic process. London: Kegan Paul.■ Martin, R. M. (1969). On Ziff's "Natural and formal languages." In S. Hook (Ed.), Language and philosophy: A symposium (pp. 249-263). New York: New York University Press.■ Mazlish, B. (1993). The fourth discontinuity: the co- evolution of humans and machines. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.■ McCarthy, J., & P. J. Hayes (1969). Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence. In B. Meltzer & D. Michie (Eds.), Machine intelligence 4. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.■ McClelland, J. L., D. E. Rumelhart & G. E. Hinton (1986). The appeal of parallel distributed processing. In D. E. Rumelhart, J. L. McClelland & the PDP Research Group (Eds.), Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the mi crostructure of cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 3-40). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/ Bradford Books.■ McCorduck, P. (1979). Machines who think. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ McLaughlin, T. (1970). Music and communication. London: Faber & Faber.■ Mednick, S. A. (1962). The associative basis of the creative process. Psychological Review 69, 431-436.■ Meehl, P. E., & C. J. Golden (1982). Taxometric methods. In Kendall, P. C., & Butcher, J. N. (Eds.), Handbook of research methods in clinical psychology (pp. 127-182). New York: Wiley.■ Mehler, J., E.C.T. Walker & M. Garrett (Eds.) (1982). Perspectives on mental rep resentation: Experimental and theoretical studies of cognitive processes and ca pacities. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Mill, J. S. (1900). A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive: Being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation. London: Longmans, Green.■ Miller, G. A. (1979, June). A very personal history. Talk to the Cognitive Science Workshop, Cambridge, MA.■ Miller, J. (1983). States of mind. New York: Pantheon Books.■ Minsky, M. (1975). A framework for representing knowledge. In P. H. Winston (Ed.), The psychology of computer vision (pp. 211-277). New York: McGrawHill.■ Minsky, M., & S. Papert (1973). Artificial intelligence. Condon Lectures, Oregon State System of Higher Education, Eugene, Oregon.■ Minsky, M. L. (1986). The society of mind. New York: Simon & Schuster.■ Mischel, T. (1976). Psychological explanations and their vicissitudes. In J. K. Cole & W. J. Arnold (Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on motivation (Vol. 23). Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press.■ Morford, M.P.O., & R. J. Lenardon (1995). Classical mythology (5th ed.). New York: Longman.■ Murdoch, I. (1954). Under the net. New York: Penguin.■ Nagel, E. (1959). Methodological issues in psychoanalytic theory. In S. Hook (Ed.), Psychoanalysis, scientific method, and philosophy: A symposium. New York: New York University Press.■ Nagel, T. (1979). Mortal questions. London: Cambridge University Press.■ Nagel, T. (1986). The view from nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.■ Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.■ Neisser, U. (1972). Changing conceptions of imagery. In P. W. Sheehan (Ed.), The function and nature of imagery (pp. 233-251). London: Academic Press.■ Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and reality. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Neisser, U. (1978). Memory: What are the important questions? In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memory (pp. 3-24). London: Academic Press.■ Neisser, U. (1979). The concept of intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg & D. K. Detterman (Eds.), Human intelligence: Perspectives on its theory and measurement (pp. 179-190). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.■ Nersessian, N. (1992). How do scientists think? Capturing the dynamics of conceptual change in science. In R. N. Giere (Ed.), Cognitive models of science (pp. 3-44). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.■ Newell, A. (1973a). Artificial intelligence and the concept of mind. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language (pp. 1-60). San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Newell, A. (1973b). You can't play 20 questions with nature and win. In W. G. Chase (Ed.), Visual information processing (pp. 283-310). New York: Academic Press.■ Newell, A., & H. A. Simon (1963). GPS: A program that simulates human thought. In E. A. Feigenbaum & J. Feldman (Eds.), Computers and thought (pp. 279-293). New York & McGraw-Hill.■ Newell, A., & H. A. Simon (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.■ Nietzsche, F. (1966). Beyond good and evil. W. Kaufmann (Trans.). New York: Vintage. (Originally published in 1885.)■ Nilsson, N. J. (1971). Problem- solving methods in artificial intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill.■ Nussbaum, M. C. (1978). Aristotle's Princeton University Press. De Motu Anamalium. Princeton, NJ:■ Oersted, H. C. (1920). Thermo-electricity. In Kirstine Meyer (Ed.), H. C. Oersted, Natuurvidenskabelige Skrifter (Vol. 2). Copenhagen: n.p. (Originally published in 1830 in The Edinburgh encyclopaedia.)■ Ong, W. J. (1982). Orality and literacy: The technologizing of the word. London: Methuen.■ Onians, R. B. (1954). The origins of European thought. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.■ Osgood, C. E. (1960). Method and theory in experimental psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. (Originally published in 1953.)■ Osgood, C. E. (1966). Language universals and psycholinguistics. In J. H. Greenberg (Ed.), Universals of language (2nd ed., pp. 299-322). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Palmer, R. E. (1969). Hermeneutics. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.■ Peirce, C. S. (1934). Some consequences of four incapacities-Man, a sign. In C. Hartsborne & P. Weiss (Eds.), Collected papers of Charles Saunders Peirce (Vol. 5, pp. 185-189). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Penfield, W. (1959). In W. Penfield & L. Roberts, Speech and brain mechanisms. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.■ Penrose, R. (1994). Shadows of the mind: A search for the missing science of conscious ness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.■ Perkins, D. N. (1981). The mind's best work. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Peterfreund, E. (1986). The heuristic approach to psychoanalytic therapy. In■ J. Reppen (Ed.), Analysts at work, (pp. 127-144). Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.■ Piaget, J. (1952). The origin of intelligence in children. New York: International Universities Press. (Originally published in 1936.)■ Piaget, J. (1954). Le langage et les opeґrations intellectuelles. Proble` mes de psycho linguistique. Symposium de l'Association de Psychologie Scientifique de Langue Francёaise. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.■ Piaget, J. (1977). Problems of equilibration. In H. E. Gruber & J. J. Voneche (Eds.), The essential Piaget (pp. 838-841). London: Routlege & Kegan Paul. (Originally published in 1975 as L'eґquilibration des structures cognitives [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France].)■ Piaget, J., & B. Inhelder. (1973). Memory and intelligence. New York: Basic Books.■ Pinker, S. (1994). The language instinct. New York: Morrow.■ Pinker, S. (1996). Facts about human language relevant to its evolution. In J.-P. Changeux & J. Chavaillon (Eds.), Origins of the human brain. A symposium of the Fyssen foundation (pp. 262-283). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Planck, M. (1949). Scientific autobiography and other papers. F. Gaynor (Trans.). New York: Philosophical Library.■ Planck, M. (1990). Wissenschaftliche Selbstbiographie. W. Berg (Ed.). Halle, Germany: Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina.■ Plato (1892). Meno. In The Dialogues of Plato (B. Jowett, Trans.; Vol. 2). New York: Clarendon. (Originally published circa 380 B.C.)■ Poincareґ, H. (1913). Mathematical creation. In The foundations of science. G. B. Halsted (Trans.). New York: Science Press.■ Poincareґ, H. (1921). The foundations of science: Science and hypothesis, the value of science, science and method. G. B. Halstead (Trans.). New York: Science Press.■ Poincareґ, H. (1929). The foundations of science: Science and hypothesis, the value of science, science and method. New York: Science Press.■ Poincareґ, H. (1952). Science and method. F. Maitland (Trans.) New York: Dover.■ Polya, G. (1945). How to solve it. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.■ Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.■ Popper, K. (1968). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. New York: Harper & Row/Basic Books.■ Popper, K., & J. Eccles (1977). The self and its brain. New York: Springer-Verlag.■ Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson.■ Putnam, H. (1975). Mind, language and reality: Philosophical papers (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Putnam, H. (1987). The faces of realism. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.■ Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1981). The imagery debate: Analog media versus tacit knowledge. In N. Block (Ed.), Imagery (pp. 151-206). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1984). Computation and cognition: Towards a foundation for cog nitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Quillian, M. R. (1968). Semantic memory. In M. Minsky (Ed.), Semantic information processing (pp. 216-260). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Quine, W.V.O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Rabbitt, P.M.A., & S. Dornic (Eds.). Attention and performance (Vol. 5). London: Academic Press.■ Rawlins, G.J.E. (1997). Slaves of the Machine: The quickening of computer technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Reid, T. (1970). An inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense. In R. Brown (Ed.), Between Hume and Mill: An anthology of British philosophy- 1749- 1843 (pp. 151-178). New York: Random House/Modern Library.■ Reitman, W. (1970). What does it take to remember? In D. A. Norman (Ed.), Models of human memory (pp. 470-510). London: Academic Press.■ Ricoeur, P. (1974). Structure and hermeneutics. In D. I. Ihde (Ed.), The conflict of interpretations: Essays in hermeneutics (pp. 27-61). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.■ Robinson, D. N. (1986). An intellectual history of psychology. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.■ Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.■ Rosch, E. (1977). Human categorization. In N. Warren (Ed.), Studies in cross cultural psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 1-49) London: Academic Press.■ Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization (pp. 27-48). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Rosch, E., & B. B. Lloyd (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Rose, S. (1970). The chemistry of life. Baltimore: Penguin Books.■ Rose, S. (1976). The conscious brain (updated ed.). New York: Random House.■ Rose, S. (1993). The making of memory: From molecules to mind. New York: Anchor Books. (Originally published in 1992)■ Roszak, T. (1994). The cult of information: A neo- Luddite treatise on high- tech, artificial intelligence, and the true art of thinking (2nd ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press.■ Royce, J. R., & W. W. Rozeboom (Eds.) (1972). The psychology of knowing. New York: Gordon & Breach.■ Rumelhart, D. E. (1977). Introduction to human information processing. New York: Wiley.■ Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. In R. J. Spiro, B. Bruce & W. F. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading comprehension. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Rumelhart, D. E., & J. L. McClelland (1986). On learning the past tenses of English verbs. In J. L. McClelland & D. E. Rumelhart (Eds.), Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cognition (Vol. 2). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Rumelhart, D. E., P. Smolensky, J. L. McClelland & G. E. Hinton (1986). Schemata and sequential thought processes in PDP models. In J. L. McClelland, D. E. Rumelhart & the PDP Research Group (Eds.), Parallel Distributed Processing (Vol. 2, pp. 7-57). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Russell, B. (1927). An outline of philosophy. London: G. Allen & Unwin.■ Russell, B. (1961). History of Western philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin.■ Russell, B. (1965). How I write. In Portraits from memory and other essays. London: Allen & Unwin.■ Russell, B. (1992). In N. Griffin (Ed.), The selected letters of Bertrand Russell (Vol. 1), The private years, 1884- 1914. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Ryecroft, C. (1966). Psychoanalysis observed. London: Constable.■ Sagan, C. (1978). The dragons of Eden: Speculations on the evolution of human intel ligence. New York: Ballantine Books.■ Salthouse, T. A. (1992). Expertise as the circumvention of human processing limitations. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 172-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Sanford, A. J. (1987). The mind of man: Models of human understanding. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.■ Sapir, E. (1921). Language. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.■ Sapir, E. (1964). Culture, language, and personality. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1941.)■ Sapir, E. (1985). The status of linguistics as a science. In D. G. Mandelbaum (Ed.), Selected writings of Edward Sapir in language, culture and personality (pp. 160166). Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1929).■ Scardmalia, M., & C. Bereiter (1992). Literate expertise. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 172-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Schafer, R. (1954). Psychoanalytic interpretation in Rorschach testing. New York: Grune & Stratten.■ Schank, R. C. (1973). Identification of conceptualizations underlying natural language. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language (pp. 187-248). San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Schank, R. C. (1976). The role of memory in language processing. In C. N. Cofer (Ed.), The structure of human memory. (pp. 162-189) San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Schank, R. C. (1986). Explanation patterns: Understanding mechanically and creatively. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Schank, R. C., & R. P. Abelson (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ SchroЁdinger, E. (1951). Science and humanism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Searle, J. R. (1981a). Minds, brains, and programs. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 282-306). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Searle, J. R. (1981b). Minds, brains and programs. In D. Hofstadter & D. Dennett (Eds.), The mind's I (pp. 353-373). New York: Basic Books.■ Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality. New York: Cambridge University Press.■ Serres, M. (1982). The origin of language: Biology, information theory, and thermodynamics. M. Anderson (Trans.). In J. V. Harari & D. F. Bell (Eds.), Hermes: Literature, science, philosophy (pp. 71-83). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.■ Simon, H. A. (1966). Scientific discovery and the psychology of problem solving. In R. G. Colodny (Ed.), Mind and cosmos: Essays in contemporary science and philosophy (pp. 22-40). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.■ Simon, H. A. (1979). Models of thought. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.■ Simon, H. A. (1989). The scientist as a problem solver. In D. Klahr & K. Kotovsky (Eds.), Complex information processing: The impact of Herbert Simon. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Simon, H. A., & C. Kaplan (1989). Foundations of cognitive science. In M. Posner (Ed.), Foundations of cognitive science (pp. 1-47). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Simonton, D. K. (1988). Creativity, leadership and chance. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. New York: Knopf.■ Smith, E. E. (1988). Concepts and thought. In J. Sternberg & E. E. Smith (Eds.), The psychology of human thought (pp. 19-49). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Smith, E. E. (1990). Thinking: Introduction. In D. N. Osherson & E. E. Smith (Eds.), Thinking. An invitation to cognitive science. (Vol. 3, pp. 1-2). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Socrates. (1958). Meno. In E. H. Warmington & P. O. Rouse (Eds.), Great dialogues of Plato W.H.D. Rouse (Trans.). New York: New American Library. (Original publication date unknown.)■ Solso, R. L. (1974). Theories of retrieval. In R. L. Solso (Ed.), Theories in cognitive psychology. Potomac, MD: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Spencer, H. (1896). The principles of psychology. New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts.■ Steiner, G. (1975). After Babel: Aspects of language and translation. New York: Oxford University Press.■ Sternberg, R. J. (1977). Intelligence, information processing, and analogical reasoning. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Sternberg, R. J. (1994). Intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg, Thinking and problem solving. San Diego: Academic Press.■ Sternberg, R. J., & J. E. Davidson (1985). Cognitive development in gifted and talented. In F. D. Horowitz & M. O'Brien (Eds.), The gifted and talented (pp. 103-135). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.■ Storr, A. (1993). The dynamics of creation. New York: Ballantine Books. (Originally published in 1972.)■ Stumpf, S. E. (1994). Philosophy: History and problems (5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.■ Sulloway, F. J. (1996). Born to rebel: Birth order, family dynamics, and creative lives. New York: Random House/Vintage Books.■ Thorndike, E. L. (1906). Principles of teaching. New York: A. G. Seiler.■ Thorndike, E. L. (1970). Animal intelligence: Experimental studies. Darien, CT: Hafner Publishing Co. (Originally published in 1911.)■ Titchener, E. B. (1910). A textbook of psychology. New York: Macmillan.■ Titchener, E. B. (1914). A primer of psychology. New York: Macmillan.■ Toulmin, S. (1957). The philosophy of science. London: Hutchinson.■ Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organisation of memory. London: Academic Press.■ Turing, A. (1946). In B. E. Carpenter & R. W. Doran (Eds.), ACE reports of 1946 and other papers. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Turkle, S. (1984). Computers and the second self: Computers and the human spirit. New York: Simon & Schuster.■ Tyler, S. A. (1978). The said and the unsaid: Mind, meaning, and culture. New York: Academic Press.■ van Heijenoort (Ed.) (1967). From Frege to Goedel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.■ Varela, F. J. (1984). The creative circle: Sketches on the natural history of circularity. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality (pp. 309-324). New York: W. W. Norton.■ Voltaire (1961). On the Penseґs of M. Pascal. In Philosophical letters (pp. 119-146). E. Dilworth (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.■ Wagman, M. (1991a). Artificial intelligence and human cognition: A theoretical inter comparison of two realms of intellect. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1991b). Cognitive science and concepts of mind: Toward a general theory of human and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1993). Cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence: Theory and re search in cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1995). The sciences of cognition: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1996). Human intellect and cognitive science: Toward a general unified theory of intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1997a). Cognitive science and the symbolic operations of human and artificial intelligence: Theory and research into the intellective processes. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1997b). The general unified theory of intelligence: Central conceptions and specific application to domains of cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998a). Cognitive science and the mind- body problem: From philosophy to psychology to artificial intelligence to imaging of the brain. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998b). Language and thought in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology, artificial intelligence, and neural science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998c). The ultimate objectives of artificial intelligence: Theoretical and research foundations, philosophical and psychological implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1999). The human mind according to artificial intelligence: Theory, re search, and implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (2000). Scientific discovery processes in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wall, R. (1972). Introduction to mathematical linguistics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.■ Wallas, G. (1926). The Art of Thought. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.■ Wason, P. (1977). Self contradictions. In P. Johnson-Laird & P. Wason (Eds.), Thinking: Readings in cognitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Wason, P. C., & P. N. Johnson-Laird. (1972). Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Watson, J. (1930). Behaviorism. New York: W. W. Norton.■ Watzlawick, P. (1984). Epilogue. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984.■ Weinberg, S. (1977). The first three minutes: A modern view of the origin of the uni verse. New York: Basic Books.■ Weisberg, R. W. (1986). Creativity: Genius and other myths. New York: W. H. Freeman.■ Weizenbaum, J. (1976). Computer power and human reason: From judgment to cal culation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Wertheimer, M. (1945). Productive thinking. New York: Harper & Bros.■ Whitehead, A. N. (1925). Science and the modern world. New York: Macmillan.■ Whorf, B. L. (1956). In J. B. Carroll (Ed.), Language, thought and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Whyte, L. L. (1962). The unconscious before Freud. New York: Anchor Books.■ Wiener, N. (1954). The human use of human beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.■ Wiener, N. (1964). God & Golem, Inc.: A comment on certain points where cybernetics impinges on religion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Winograd, T. (1972). Understanding natural language. New York: Academic Press.■ Winston, P. H. (1987). Artificial intelligence: A perspective. In E. L. Grimson & R. S. Patil (Eds.), AI in the 1980s and beyond (pp. 1-12). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Winston, P. H. (Ed.) (1975). The psychology of computer vision. New York: McGrawHill.■ Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.■ Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The blue and brown books. New York: Harper Colophon.■ Woods, W. A. (1975). What's in a link: Foundations for semantic networks. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representations and understanding: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 35-84). New York: Academic Press.■ Woodworth, R. S. (1938). Experimental psychology. New York: Holt; London: Methuen (1939).■ Wundt, W. (1904). Principles of physiological psychology (Vol. 1). E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.■ Wundt, W. (1907). Lectures on human and animal psychology. J. E. Creighton & E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.■ Young, J. Z. (1978). Programs of the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.■ Ziman, J. (1978). Reliable knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
-
10 Mind
It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science... to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reflection and inquiry.... It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from one another, and that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflection and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. (Hume, 1955, p. 22)Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. (Locke, quoted in Herrnstein & Boring, 1965, p. 584)The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied.... Man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers. (Leґvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 230)MIND. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. (Bierce, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 55)[Philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind, so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation.... We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (Rorty, 1979, pp. 3-4)Under pressure from the computer, the question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to Victorians-threat, obsession, taboo, and fascination. (Turkle, 1984, p. 313)7) Understanding the Mind Remains as Resistant to Neurological as to Cognitive AnalysesRecent years have been exciting for researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences. Both fields have flourished, each spurred on by methodological and conceptual developments, and although understanding the mechanisms of mind is an objective shared by many workers in these areas, their theories and approaches to the problem are vastly different....Early experimental psychologists, such as Wundt and James, were as interested in and knowledgeable about the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as about the young science of the mind. However, the experimental study of mental processes was short-lived, being eclipsed by the rise of behaviorism early in this century. It was not until the late 1950s that the signs of a new mentalism first appeared in scattered writings of linguists, philosophers, computer enthusiasts, and psychologists.In this new incarnation, the science of mind had a specific mission: to challenge and replace behaviorism. In the meantime, brain science had in many ways become allied with a behaviorist approach.... While behaviorism sought to reduce the mind to statements about bodily action, brain science seeks to explain the mind in terms of physiochemical events occurring in the nervous system. These approaches contrast with contemporary cognitive science, which tries to understand the mind as it is, without any reduction, a view sometimes described as functionalism.The cognitive revolution is now in place. Cognition is the subject of contemporary psychology. This was achieved with little or no talk of neurons, action potentials, and neurotransmitters. Similarly, neuroscience has risen to an esteemed position among the biological sciences without much talk of cognitive processes. Do the fields need each other?... [Y]es because the problem of understanding the mind, unlike the wouldbe problem solvers, respects no disciplinary boundaries. It remains as resistant to neurological as to cognitive analyses. (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, pp. 1-2)Since the Second World War scientists from different disciplines have turned to the study of the human mind. Computer scientists have tried to emulate its capacity for visual perception. Linguists have struggled with the puzzle of how children acquire language. Ethologists have sought the innate roots of social behaviour. Neurophysiologists have begun to relate the function of nerve cells to complex perceptual and motor processes. Neurologists and neuropsychologists have used the pattern of competence and incompetence of their brain-damaged patients to elucidate the normal workings of the brain. Anthropologists have examined the conceptual structure of cultural practices to advance hypotheses about the basic principles of the mind. These days one meets engineers who work on speech perception, biologists who investigate the mental representation of spatial relations, and physicists who want to understand consciousness. And, of course, psychologists continue to study perception, memory, thought and action.... [W]orkers in many disciplines have converged on a number of central problems and explanatory ideas. They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline-artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy-going to have any greater success. (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 7)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind
-
11 Thinking
But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (Descartes, 1951, p. 153)I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there "must be" a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.... If we scrutinize the usages which we make of "thinking," "meaning," "wishing," etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some particular medium. (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 41-43)Analyse the proofs employed by the subject. If they do not go beyond observation of empirical correspondences, they can be fully explained in terms of concrete operations, and nothing would warrant our assuming that more complex thought mechanisms are operating. If, on the other hand, the subject interprets a given correspondence as the result of any one of several possible combinations, and this leads him to verify his hypotheses by observing their consequences, we know that propositional operations are involved. (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 279)In every age, philosophical thinking exploits some dominant concepts and makes its greatest headway in solving problems conceived in terms of them. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers construed knowledge, knower, and known in terms of sense data and their association. Descartes' self-examination gave classical psychology the mind and its contents as a starting point. Locke set up sensory immediacy as the new criterion of the real... Hobbes provided the genetic method of building up complex ideas from simple ones... and, in another quarter, still true to the Hobbesian method, Pavlov built intellect out of conditioned reflexes and Loeb built life out of tropisms. (S. Langer, 1962, p. 54)Experiments on deductive reasoning show that subjects are influenced sufficiently by their experience for their reasoning to differ from that described by a purely deductive system, whilst experiments on inductive reasoning lead to the view that an understanding of the strategies used by adult subjects in attaining concepts involves reference to higher-order concepts of a logical and deductive nature. (Bolton, 1972, p. 154)There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until-in the visible future-the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. (Newell & Simon, quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 138)But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition... whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action.... I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)It is well to remember that when philosophy emerged in Greece in the sixth century, B.C., it did not burst suddenly out of the Mediterranean blue. The development of societies of reasoning creatures-what we call civilization-had been a process to be measured not in thousands but in millions of years. Human beings became civilized as they became reasonable, and for an animal to begin to reason and to learn how to improve its reasoning is a long, slow process. So thinking had been going on for ages before Greece-slowly improving itself, uncovering the pitfalls to be avoided by forethought, endeavoring to weigh alternative sets of consequences intellectually. What happened in the sixth century, B.C., is that thinking turned round on itself; people began to think about thinking, and the momentous event, the culmination of the long process to that point, was in fact the birth of philosophy. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. xi)The way to look at thought is not to assume that there is a parallel thread of correlated affects or internal experiences that go with it in some regular way. It's not of course that people don't have internal experiences, of course they do; but that when you ask what is the state of mind of someone, say while he or she is performing a ritual, it's hard to believe that such experiences are the same for all people involved.... The thinking, and indeed the feeling in an odd sort of way, is really going on in public. They are really saying what they're saying, doing what they're doing, meaning what they're meaning. Thought is, in great part anyway, a public activity. (Geertz, quoted in J. Miller, 1983, pp. 202-203)Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. (Einstein, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 17)What, in effect, are the conditions for the construction of formal thought? The child must not only apply operations to objects-in other words, mentally execute possible actions on them-he must also "reflect" those operations in the absence of the objects which are replaced by pure propositions. Thus, "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action.... It is not surprising, therefore, that the system of concrete operations must be completed during the last years of childhood before it can be "reflected" by formal operations. In terms of their function, formal operations do not differ from concrete operations except that they are applied to hypotheses or propositions [whose logic is] an abstract translation of the system of "inference" that governs concrete operations. (Piaget, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 237)[E]ven a human being today (hence, a fortiori, a remote ancestor of contemporary human beings) cannot easily or ordinarily maintain uninterrupted attention on a single problem for more than a few tens of seconds. Yet we work on problems that require vastly more time. The way we do that (as we can observe by watching ourselves) requires periods of mulling to be followed by periods of recapitulation, describing to ourselves what seems to have gone on during the mulling, leading to whatever intermediate results we have reached. This has an obvious function: namely, by rehearsing these interim results... we commit them to memory, for the immediate contents of the stream of consciousness are very quickly lost unless rehearsed.... Given language, we can describe to ourselves what seemed to occur during the mulling that led to a judgment, produce a rehearsable version of the reaching-a-judgment process, and commit that to long-term memory by in fact rehearsing it. (Margolis, 1987, p. 60)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Thinking
-
12 Psychology
We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature.... [W]e proceed to human philosophy or Humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate, or distributively; the other congregate, or in society. So as Human philosophy is either Simple and Particular, or Conjugate and Civil. Humanity Particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the Body, and of knowledges that respect the Mind... how the one discloseth the other and how the one worketh upon the other... [:] the one is honored with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. (Bacon, 1878, pp. 236-237)The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science are... not smaller but greater than those of any other science. If its phenomena are contemplated objectively, merely as nervo-muscular adjustments by which the higher organisms from moment to moment adapt their actions to environing co-existences and sequences, its degree of specialty, even then, entitles it to a separate place. The moment the element of feeling, or consciousness, is used to interpret nervo-muscular adjustments as thus exhibited in the living beings around, objective Psychology acquires an additional, and quite exceptional, distinction. (Spencer, 1896, p. 141)Kant once declared that psychology was incapable of ever raising itself to the rank of an exact natural science. The reasons that he gives... have often been repeated in later times. In the first place, Kant says, psychology cannot become an exact science because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense; the pure internal perception, in which mental phenomena must be constructed,-time,-has but one dimension. In the second place, however, it cannot even become an experimental science, because in it the manifold of internal observation cannot be arbitrarily varied,-still less, another thinking subject be submitted to one's experiments, comformably to the end in view; moreover, the very fact of observation means alteration of the observed object. (Wundt, 1904, p. 6)It is [Gustav] Fechner's service to have found and followed the true way; to have shown us how a "mathematical psychology" may, within certain limits, be realized in practice.... He was the first to show how Herbart's idea of an "exact psychology" might be turned to practical account. (Wundt, 1904, pp. 6-7)"Mind," "intellect," "reason," "understanding," etc. are concepts... that existed before the advent of any scientific psychology. The fact that the naive consciousness always and everywhere points to internal experience as a special source of knowledge, may, therefore, be accepted for the moment as sufficient testimony to the rights of psychology as science.... "Mind," will accordingly be the subject, to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal observation as predicates. The subject itself is determined p. 17) wholly and exclusively by its predicates. (Wundt, 1904,The study of animal psychology may be approached from two different points of view. We may set out from the notion of a kind of comparative physiology of mind, a universal history of the development of mental life in the organic world. Or we may make human psychology the principal object of investigation. Then, the expressions of mental life in animals will be taken into account only so far as they throw light upon the evolution of consciousness in man.... Human psychology... may confine itself altogether to man, and generally has done so to far too great an extent. There are plenty of psychological text-books from which you would hardly gather that there was any other conscious life than the human. (Wundt, 1907, pp. 340-341)The Behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined. (Watson, 1930, pp. 5-6)According to the medieval classification of the sciences, psychology is merely a chapter of special physics, although the most important chapter; for man is a microcosm; he is the central figure of the universe. (deWulf, 1956, p. 125)At the beginning of this century the prevailing thesis in psychology was Associationism.... Behavior proceeded by the stream of associations: each association produced its successors, and acquired new attachments with the sensations arriving from the environment.In the first decade of the century a reaction developed to this doctrine through the work of the Wurzburg school. Rejecting the notion of a completely self-determining stream of associations, it introduced the task ( Aufgabe) as a necessary factor in describing the process of thinking. The task gave direction to thought. A noteworthy innovation of the Wurzburg school was the use of systematic introspection to shed light on the thinking process and the contents of consciousness. The result was a blend of mechanics and phenomenalism, which gave rise in turn to two divergent antitheses, Behaviorism and the Gestalt movement. The behavioristic reaction insisted that introspection was a highly unstable, subjective procedure.... Behaviorism reformulated the task of psychology as one of explaining the response of organisms as a function of the stimuli impinging upon them and measuring both objectively. However, Behaviorism accepted, and indeed reinforced, the mechanistic assumption that the connections between stimulus and response were formed and maintained as simple, determinate functions of the environment.The Gestalt reaction took an opposite turn. It rejected the mechanistic nature of the associationist doctrine but maintained the value of phenomenal observation. In many ways it continued the Wurzburg school's insistence that thinking was more than association-thinking has direction given to it by the task or by the set of the subject. Gestalt psychology elaborated this doctrine in genuinely new ways in terms of holistic principles of organization.Today psychology lives in a state of relatively stable tension between the poles of Behaviorism and Gestalt psychology.... (Newell & Simon, 1963, pp. 279-280)As I examine the fate of our oppositions, looking at those already in existence as guide to how they fare and shape the course of science, it seems to me that clarity is never achieved. Matters simply become muddier and muddier as we go down through time. Thus, far from providing the rungs of a ladder by which psychology gradually climbs to clarity, this form of conceptual structure leads rather to an ever increasing pile of issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but never really settle. (Newell, 1973b, pp. 288-289)The subject matter of psychology is as old as reflection. Its broad practical aims are as dated as human societies. Human beings, in any period, have not been indifferent to the validity of their knowledge, unconcerned with the causes of their behavior or that of their prey and predators. Our distant ancestors, no less than we, wrestled with the problems of social organization, child rearing, competition, authority, individual differences, personal safety. Solving these problems required insights-no matter how untutored-into the psychological dimensions of life. Thus, if we are to follow the convention of treating psychology as a young discipline, we must have in mind something other than its subject matter. We must mean that it is young in the sense that physics was young at the time of Archimedes or in the sense that geometry was "founded" by Euclid and "fathered" by Thales. Sailing vessels were launched long before Archimedes discovered the laws of bouyancy [ sic], and pillars of identical circumference were constructed before anyone knew that C IID. We do not consider the ship builders and stone cutters of antiquity physicists and geometers. Nor were the ancient cave dwellers psychologists merely because they rewarded the good conduct of their children. The archives of folk wisdom contain a remarkable collection of achievements, but craft-no matter how perfected-is not science, nor is a litany of successful accidents a discipline. If psychology is young, it is young as a scientific discipline but it is far from clear that psychology has attained this status. (Robinson, 1986, p. 12)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Psychology
-
13 design
1) проект
2) дизайн
3) конструировать
4) конструкторский
5) конструкция
6) оптимальный
7) оформление
8) проектирование
9) проектировать
10) решение конструктивное
11) составлять план
12) планировка
13) рисовать
14) рисунок
15) синтез
16) расчетный
17) исполнение
18) конструирование
19) проектный
20) чертеж
21) конструктивный
– associate design
– automated design
– breadboard design
– circuit design
– civil-engineering design
– computer-aided design
– conceptual design
– contractor design
– cut-and-try design
– design an experiment
– design approach
– design arrangement
– design condition
– design draught
– design elevation
– design features
– design formula
– design load
– design longevity
– design moment
– design of an experiment
– design of experiment
– design of experiments
– design office
– design optimization
– design philosophy
– design pitch
– design power
– design pressure
– design procedure
– design quantity
– design reliability
– design schedule
– design stress
– design team
– design waterline
– design work
– detail design
– develop a design
– double-buttion design
– engineering design
– experimental design
– logical design
– modular design
– physical design
– preliminary design
– process design
– refine a design
– ruggedize the design
– simple in design
– structural design
– system design
– typographic design
– unconventional design
– unit-type design
completely randomized design — полностью рандомизированный план
conception phase of IC design — проработка логической структуры ИС
experimental design office — <engin.> бюро конструкторское опытное
principle of module design — <aeron.> принцип агрегатный
special design office — <engin.> бюро конструкторское особое
-
14 EP
1) Общая лексика: ОПР, Experimental Programme2) Медицина: электрофизиология (ЭФ)3) Военный термин: ELINT Processor, Electronic Protection, early production, earth penetrator, electric primer, electronic patrol, electronics package, electronics panel, emergency planning, emission policy, ending period, enemy position, engine performance, engineer personnel, engineering personnel, engineering philosophy, engineering practice, engineering process, enlisted personnel, entrucking point, estimated position, expanding point4) Техника: electro pneumatic, electronic package, electronic photography, electrostatic powder, emergency plan, emergency power, engineering prototype, epoxide, equipment piece, etched plate5) Математика: оценка вероятности (estimated probability), точка равновесия (equilibrium point)6) Экономика: (economic profit) экономическая прибыль7) Финансы: (Equator principles) экваториальные приниципы (Образное название международно-признанного эталона для оценки и управления социальными и экологическими рисками проектного финансирования)8) Автомобильный термин: exhaust pressure9) Музыка: альбом (extended play), мини-альбом, пластинка, миньон (от англ. Extended Play. Запись, которая содержит больше музыки, чем сингл, но меньше, чем альбом.), мини-альбом10) Телекоммуникации: entrance point11) Сокращение: Civil aircraft marking (Iran), Earth Penetrating, Electronic Protection (Now known as ECCM), Electronic Protection (formerly ECCM), Emergency Preparedness, European Parliament, Exercise Practice, Experience Points, Extended Play, epitaxial planar, electrically polarized (relay)12) Вычислительная техника: editing program, electronic publishing, end of program, entry point, evaluation program, конец программы, программа оценки, программа-редактор, электронная издательская деятельность, электронные издательские системы13) Нефть: additive extreme-pressure lubricant, electric pump, electromagnetic pipe inspection log, engineering and procurement, engineering procurement, experimental program, mix ethane-propane mix, противозадирный (о смазке, extreme pressure), взрывозащищённый (explosion-proof), extreme pressure (lubricant)14) Экология: environmental protection15) Патенты: Европейский патент16) Глоссарий компании Сахалин Энерджи: Earning Power, Exploration and Production, end point (temperature at which all of a fraction is vaporized)17) Полимеры: easy-processing, effective pressure, end/picks, epoxy plastic, epoxy polymers, ethylene-propylene, extreme pressure18) Автоматика: exploration procedure19) Сахалин Р: Exploration & Production20) Химическое оружие: emergency procedure, equipment procurement, extracting procedure21) Физическая химия: entrance potential (в масс-спектроскопии)22) Макаров: electrically polarized, epoxy resin23) Расширение файла: Electrophotographic Engine24) Фармация: Европейская Фармакопея (Сокращенно Евр.Ф.) -
15 Ep
1) Общая лексика: ОПР, Experimental Programme2) Медицина: электрофизиология (ЭФ)3) Военный термин: ELINT Processor, Electronic Protection, early production, earth penetrator, electric primer, electronic patrol, electronics package, electronics panel, emergency planning, emission policy, ending period, enemy position, engine performance, engineer personnel, engineering personnel, engineering philosophy, engineering practice, engineering process, enlisted personnel, entrucking point, estimated position, expanding point4) Техника: electro pneumatic, electronic package, electronic photography, electrostatic powder, emergency plan, emergency power, engineering prototype, epoxide, equipment piece, etched plate5) Математика: оценка вероятности (estimated probability), точка равновесия (equilibrium point)6) Экономика: (economic profit) экономическая прибыль7) Финансы: (Equator principles) экваториальные приниципы (Образное название международно-признанного эталона для оценки и управления социальными и экологическими рисками проектного финансирования)8) Автомобильный термин: exhaust pressure9) Музыка: альбом (extended play), мини-альбом, пластинка, миньон (от англ. Extended Play. Запись, которая содержит больше музыки, чем сингл, но меньше, чем альбом.), мини-альбом10) Телекоммуникации: entrance point11) Сокращение: Civil aircraft marking (Iran), Earth Penetrating, Electronic Protection (Now known as ECCM), Electronic Protection (formerly ECCM), Emergency Preparedness, European Parliament, Exercise Practice, Experience Points, Extended Play, epitaxial planar, electrically polarized (relay)12) Вычислительная техника: editing program, electronic publishing, end of program, entry point, evaluation program, конец программы, программа оценки, программа-редактор, электронная издательская деятельность, электронные издательские системы13) Нефть: additive extreme-pressure lubricant, electric pump, electromagnetic pipe inspection log, engineering and procurement, engineering procurement, experimental program, mix ethane-propane mix, противозадирный (о смазке, extreme pressure), взрывозащищённый (explosion-proof), extreme pressure (lubricant)14) Экология: environmental protection15) Патенты: Европейский патент16) Глоссарий компании Сахалин Энерджи: Earning Power, Exploration and Production, end point (temperature at which all of a fraction is vaporized)17) Полимеры: easy-processing, effective pressure, end/picks, epoxy plastic, epoxy polymers, ethylene-propylene, extreme pressure18) Автоматика: exploration procedure19) Сахалин Р: Exploration & Production20) Химическое оружие: emergency procedure, equipment procurement, extracting procedure21) Физическая химия: entrance potential (в масс-спектроскопии)22) Макаров: electrically polarized, epoxy resin23) Расширение файла: Electrophotographic Engine24) Фармация: Европейская Фармакопея (Сокращенно Евр.Ф.) -
16 ep
1) Общая лексика: ОПР, Experimental Programme2) Медицина: электрофизиология (ЭФ)3) Военный термин: ELINT Processor, Electronic Protection, early production, earth penetrator, electric primer, electronic patrol, electronics package, electronics panel, emergency planning, emission policy, ending period, enemy position, engine performance, engineer personnel, engineering personnel, engineering philosophy, engineering practice, engineering process, enlisted personnel, entrucking point, estimated position, expanding point4) Техника: electro pneumatic, electronic package, electronic photography, electrostatic powder, emergency plan, emergency power, engineering prototype, epoxide, equipment piece, etched plate5) Математика: оценка вероятности (estimated probability), точка равновесия (equilibrium point)6) Экономика: (economic profit) экономическая прибыль7) Финансы: (Equator principles) экваториальные приниципы (Образное название международно-признанного эталона для оценки и управления социальными и экологическими рисками проектного финансирования)8) Автомобильный термин: exhaust pressure9) Музыка: альбом (extended play), мини-альбом, пластинка, миньон (от англ. Extended Play. Запись, которая содержит больше музыки, чем сингл, но меньше, чем альбом.), мини-альбом10) Телекоммуникации: entrance point11) Сокращение: Civil aircraft marking (Iran), Earth Penetrating, Electronic Protection (Now known as ECCM), Electronic Protection (formerly ECCM), Emergency Preparedness, European Parliament, Exercise Practice, Experience Points, Extended Play, epitaxial planar, electrically polarized (relay)12) Вычислительная техника: editing program, electronic publishing, end of program, entry point, evaluation program, конец программы, программа оценки, программа-редактор, электронная издательская деятельность, электронные издательские системы13) Нефть: additive extreme-pressure lubricant, electric pump, electromagnetic pipe inspection log, engineering and procurement, engineering procurement, experimental program, mix ethane-propane mix, противозадирный (о смазке, extreme pressure), взрывозащищённый (explosion-proof), extreme pressure (lubricant)14) Экология: environmental protection15) Патенты: Европейский патент16) Глоссарий компании Сахалин Энерджи: Earning Power, Exploration and Production, end point (temperature at which all of a fraction is vaporized)17) Полимеры: easy-processing, effective pressure, end/picks, epoxy plastic, epoxy polymers, ethylene-propylene, extreme pressure18) Автоматика: exploration procedure19) Сахалин Р: Exploration & Production20) Химическое оружие: emergency procedure, equipment procurement, extracting procedure21) Физическая химия: entrance potential (в масс-спектроскопии)22) Макаров: electrically polarized, epoxy resin23) Расширение файла: Electrophotographic Engine24) Фармация: Европейская Фармакопея (Сокращенно Евр.Ф.) -
17 experiential
a филос. опытный, основанный на опыте; данный в опыте, эмпирическийСинонимический ряд:experimental (adj.) empirical; experient; experimental; hypothetical; provisional; speculative -
18 Thomson, Sir William, Lord Kelvin
[br]b. 26 June 1824 Belfast, Ireland (now Northern Ireland)d. 17 December 1907 Largs, Scotland[br]Irish physicist and inventor who contributed to submarine telegraphy and instrumentation.[br]After education at Glasgow University and Peterhouse, Cambridge, a period of study in France gave Thomson an interest in experimental work and instrumentation. He became Professor of Natural Philosophy at Glasgow in 1846 and retained the position for the rest of his career, establishing the first teaching laboratory in Britain.Among his many contributions to science and engineering was his concept, introduced in 1848, of an "absolute" zero of temperature. Following on from the work of Joule, his investigations into the nature of heat led to the first successful liquefaction of gases such as hydrogen and helium, and later to the science of low-temperature physics.Cable telegraphy gave an impetus to the scientific measurement of electrical quantities, and for many years Thomson was a member of the British Association Committee formed in 1861 to consider electrical standards and to develop units; these are still in use. Thomson first became Scientific Adviser to the Atlantic Telegraph Company in 1857, sailing on the Agamemnon and Great Eastern during the cable-laying expeditions. He invented a mirror galvanometer and more importantly the siphon recorder, which, used as a very sensitive telegraph receiver, provided a permanent record of signals. He also laid down the design parameters of long submarine cables and discovered that the conductivity of copper was greatly affected by its purity. A major part of the success of the Atlantic cable in 1866 was due to Thomson, who received a knighthood for his contribution.Other instruments he designed included a quadrant electrostatic voltmeter to measure high voltages, and his "multi-cellular" instrument for low voltages. They could be used on alternating or direct current and were free from temperature errors. His balances for precision current measurement were widely used in standardizing laboratories.Thomson was a prolific writer of scientific papers on subjects across the whole spectrum of physics; between 1855 and 1866 he published some 110 papers, with a total during his life of over 600. In 1892 he was raised to the peerage as Baron Kelvin of Largs. By the time of his death he was looked upon as the "father" of British physics, but despite his outstanding achievements his later years were spent resisting change and progress.[br]Principal Honours and DistinctionsKnighted 1866. Created Lord Kelvin of Largs 1892. FRS 1851. President, Royal Society 1890–4. An original member of the Order of Merit 1902. President, Society of Telegraph Engineers 1874. President, Institution of Electrical Engineers 1889 and 1907. Royal Society Royal Medal 1856, Copley Medal 1883.Bibliography1872, Reprints of Papers on Electrostatics and Magnetism, London; 1911, Mathematical and Physical Papers, 6 vols, Cambridge (collections of Thomson's papers).Further ReadingSilvanus P.Thompson, 1910, The Life of William Thomson, Baron Kelvin of Largs, 2 vols, London (an uncritical biography).D.B.Wilson, 1987, Kelvin and Stokes: A Comparative Study in Victorian Physics, Bristol (provides a present-day commentary on all aspects of Thomson's work).J.G.Crowther, 1962, British Scientists of the 19th Century, London, pp. 199–257 (a short critical biography).GWBiographical history of technology > Thomson, Sir William, Lord Kelvin
-
19 Watson-Watt, Sir Robert Alexander
[br]b. 13 April 1892 Brechin, Angus, Scotlandd. 6 December 1973 Inverness, Scotland[br]Scottish engineer and scientific adviser known for his work on radar.[br]Following education at Brechin High School, Watson-Watt entered University College, Dundee (then a part of the University of St Andrews), obtaining a BSc in engineering in 1912. From 1912 until 1921 he was Assistant to the Professor of Natural Philosophy at St Andrews, but during the First World War he also held various posts in the Meteorological Office. During. this time, in 1916 he proposed the use of cathode ray oscillographs for radio-direction-finding displays. He joined the newly formed Radio Research Station at Slough when it was opened in 1924, and 3 years later, when it amalgamated with the Radio Section of the National Physical Laboratory, he became Superintendent at Slough. At this time he proposed the name "ionosphere" for the ionized layer in the upper atmosphere. With E.V. Appleton and J.F.Herd he developed the "squegger" hard-valve transformer-coupled timebase and with the latter devised a direction-finding radio-goniometer.In 1933 he was asked to investigate possible aircraft counter-measures. He soon showed that it was impossible to make the wished-for radio "death-ray", but had the idea of using the detection of reflected radio-waves as a means of monitoring the approach of enemy aircraft. With six assistants he developed this idea and constructed an experimental system of radar (RAdio Detection And Ranging) in which arrays of aerials were used to detect the reflected signals and deduce the bearing and height. To realize a practical system, in September 1936 he was appointed Director of the Bawdsey Research Station near Felixstowe and carried out operational studies of radar. The result was that within two years the East Coast of the British Isles was equipped with a network of radar transmitters and receivers working in the 7–14 metre band—the so-called "chain-home" system—which did so much to assist the efficient deployment of RAF Fighter Command against German bombing raids on Britain in the early years of the Second World War.In 1938 he moved to the Air Ministry as Director of Communications Development, becoming Scientific Adviser to the Air Ministry and Ministry of Aircraft Production in 1940, then Deputy Chairman of the War Cabinet Radio Board in 1943. After the war he set up Sir Robert Watson-Watt \& Partners, an industrial consultant firm. He then spent some years in relative retirement in Canada, but returned to Scotland before his death.[br]Principal Honours and DistinctionsKnighted 1942. CBE 1941. FRS 1941. US Medal of Merit 1946. Royal Society Hughes Medal 1948. Franklin Institute Elliot Cresson Medal 1957. LLD St Andrews 1943. At various times: President, Royal Meteorological Society, Institute of Navigation and Institute of Professional Civil Servants; Vice-President, American Institute of Radio Engineers.Bibliography1923, with E.V.Appleton \& J.F.Herd, British patent no. 235,254 (for the "squegger"). 1926, with J.F.Herd, "An instantaneous direction reading radio goniometer", Journal ofthe Institution of Electrical Engineers 64:611.1933, The Cathode Ray Oscillograph in Radio Research.1935, Through the Weather Hours (autobiography).1936, "Polarisation errors in direction finders", Wireless Engineer 13:3. 1958, Three Steps to Victory.1959, The Pulse of Radar.1961, Man's Means to his End.Further ReadingS.S.Swords, 1986, Technical History of the Beginnings of Radar, Stevenage: Peter Peregrinus.KFBiographical history of technology > Watson-Watt, Sir Robert Alexander
См. также в других словарях:
Experimental philosophy — is a form of philosophical inquiry that makes at least partial use of quantitative research especially opinion polling in order to address philosophical questions. This is in contrast with more traditional methods found in analytic philosophy,… … Wikipedia
Plumian Professor of Astronomy and Experimental Philosophy — The Plumian chair of Astronomy and Experimental Philosophy is one of the two major Professorships in Astronomy at Cambridge University, alongside the Lowndean Professorship. The chair is currently held at the Institute of Astronomy in the… … Wikipedia
Batavian Society for Experimental Philosophy — The Batavian Society for Experimental Philosophy ( nl. Bataafsch Genootschap voor Proefondervindelijke Wijsbegeerte) is a Dutch learned society residing in Rotterdam.The society was founded on June 3, 1769 after Steven Hoogendijk declared in his… … Wikipedia
Plumian Professor of Astronomy and Experimental Philosophy — Der Lehrstuhl Plumian Professor of Astronomy and Experimental Philosophy an der Cambridge University wurde 1704 von Thomas Plume (1630–1704), der auch die Plume Library in Maldon, Essex, gründete, gestiftet. Lehrstuhlinhaber waren oder sind:… … Deutsch Wikipedia
Philosophy — For other uses, see Philosophy (disambiguation) … Wikipedia
Philosophy — • Detailed article on the history of the love of wisdom Catholic Encyclopedia. Kevin Knight. 2006. Philosophy Philosophy † … Catholic encyclopedia
Experimental Mathematics (journal) — Experimental Mathematics is a quarterly mathematical journal published by A. K. Peters, Ltd. The journal publishes papers in experimental mathematics, broadly construed. The journal s mission statement describes its scope as follows: Experimental … Wikipedia
Experimental film — or experimental cinema is a type of cinema. Experimental film is an artistic practice relieving both of visual arts and cinema. Its origins can be found in European avant garde movements of the twenties. Experimental cinema has built its history… … Wikipedia
Experimental psychology — approaches psychology as one of the natural sciences, investigates it using the experimental method. The focus of experimental psychology is on discovering the underlying processes behind behavior and the specific nature of mental life. This is… … Wikipedia
Philosophy of physics — is the study of the fundamental, philosophical questions underlying modern physics, the study of matter and energy and how they interact. The main questions concern the nature of space and time, atoms and atomism. Also the predictions of… … Wikipedia
philosophy, Western — Introduction history of Western philosophy from its development among the ancient Greeks to the present. This article has three basic purposes: (1) to provide an overview of the history of philosophy in the West, (2) to relate… … Universalium